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Abstract
We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one ￿rm must commit to
uniform pricing while the competitor￿ s pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmet-
ric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behaviour-based price discrimination within
the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and
competitive segments. We ￿nd that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only leads
to higher pro￿ts for the unconstrained ￿rm if the monopolistic segment is large enough.
Therefore, a regulatory policy objective of encouraging entry is not served by an asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint if the monopolistic segment is small. Only when the monop-
olistic segment is small and rivalry exists in the competitive segment does the asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint enhance welfare.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyses an oligopoly with a price discrimination constraint on only one ￿rm. We
label this as an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. An asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint occurs in practice in both regulatory and competition policy contexts and is typically
imposed on a ￿rm with signi￿cant market power.
In a regulatory context such no-discrimination constraints are often imposed on former state
monopolists. The objective is to encourage entry after liberalisation, by prohibiting selective
rebates by the incumbent for customers that switched to entrants. Another objective is the
protection of certain groups of customers that still do not have a choice after liberalisation,
by prohibiting the incumbent to selectively charge higher prices for only those groups. In this
respect, regulators impose a universal service obligation on the incumbent that may take the
form of a uniform pricing constraint across its monopoly and competitive segments. Examples of
regulatory asymmetric no-discrimination constraints include the energy regulator in the United
Kingdom, Ofgem, which investigated customer win-back pricing strategies by the former incum-
bent, London Electricity, following a complaint by an entrant.1 Another example concerns the
gas sector in the United Kingdom. The incumbent British Gas was not allowed to price discrim-
inate between customers with dual-fuel equipment that had alternatives to gas and customers
that had not.2
Asymmetric no-discrimination constraints are also imposed in a competition policy context.
In Europe, for example, article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union pro-
hibits dominant ￿rms to abuse their dominant position. Price discrimination, for example in the
form of selective price cuts speci￿cally targeted at competitors￿customers, may constitute such
an abuse. Also charging di⁄erent prices to di⁄erent groups of customers may already establish
abuse on itself under article 102. Examples of price discrimination abuse of dominance cases in
Europe include Compagnie Maritime Belge and Irish Sugar.3 In Compagnie Maritime Belge,
the European Court of Justice judged that selective price cuts aimed at eliminating competitors
1Ofgem decided that this behaviour by London Electricity was not illegal because of the limited number of
customers that were targeted (see Ofgem￿ s decision ￿The Gas and Electricity Market Authority￿ s Decision under
the Competition Act 1998 that London Electricity Plc has not infringed the Prohibition Imposed by Section 18(1)
of the Act with regard to a ￿Win Back￿O⁄er￿ , 12 September 2003.
2Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), ￿British Gas￿ , 1988.
3Judgment of the Court of First Instance, Compagnie Maritime Belge v. Commission, C-395/96 and C396/96,
3 March 2000; Judgment of the Court of First Instance, Irish Sugar v. Commission, Case T-228/97, 7 October
1999.
2on contested shipping routes, while continuing higher prices for uncontested services, was an
abuse. In Irish Sugar, the European Court of First Instance judged several price discrimination
practices by Irish Sugar to establish abuse of dominance, including selective rebates to customers
of a French sugar importer, ￿sugar export rebates￿to industrial customers that exported outside
Ireland and ￿border rebates￿to customers close to the border with Northern Ireland that could
purchase sugar cheaper from the United Kingdom.
In fact, two di⁄erent price discrimination practices occur in these examples taken from
regulation and competition policy. First, a ￿rm with signi￿cant market power applies behaviour-
based price discrimination within the competitive segment when it selectively targets customers
that switched to entrants in order to win them back. Second, third-degree price discrimination is
practiced when a ￿rm with signi￿cant market power sets di⁄erent prices across its competitive
and monopolistic segments. This paper analyses an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
which is a combined constraint of price discrimination within a competitive segment (behaviour-
based) and across the monopolistic and competitive segments (third-degree) that applies only
to the ￿rm with signi￿cant market power.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in various ways. First, while the existing price
discrimination literature mainly studies the consequences of changing all ￿rms￿pricing strategies
in a symmetric way, our focus is on the consequences of limiting the pricing strategies of one ￿rm
only. In particular, we study the welfare consequences when only one ￿rm must commit to uni-
form pricing for regulatory reasons (e.g. a universal service obligation) or competition purposes
(e.g. abuse of dominance), while the competitor￿ s pricing mode is left unconstrained. Second,
our model studies how the competitive e⁄ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
within a competitive segment (i) alter when the constraint also applies across competitive and
monopolistic segments, and (ii) change with the size of the monopolistic segment. We show that
an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint on the ￿rm with signi￿cant market power enhances
welfare as long as its monopoly segment is not too large. Third, we highlight that interaction
between a static (third-degree) and dynamic (behaviour-based) form of price discrimination may
result in opposing policy conclusions. In particular, while a no-discrimination constraint in a
static analysis suggests that competitition may be augmented if the entrant must still decide on
entry, a dynamic framework may result in less entry. More generally, our analysis contributes
to the competition policy and regulation literature as it shows that the combination of two
instruments (a no-discrimination constraint within and across segments) may lead to outcomes
that are unintended by each instrument separately.
3We consider a model with a monopolistic and competitive segment in the spirit of Armstrong
and Vickers (1993), with two periods and strategic interaction in the competitive segment. When
the dominant ￿rm can set its prices unrestrainedly, it practices third-degree price discrimination
by charging the monopoly price in its monopolistic segment. The dominant ￿rm competes
with its rival on the competitive segment in uniform prices in the ￿rst period and practices,
as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) behaviour-based price discrimination in the second period.
We study the competitive and welfare e⁄ects when there is an asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint imposed on the ￿rm that serves the monopolistic and the competitive segment, while
the other ￿rm serving only the competitive segment is left unrestrained.
Our two-period analysis yields the following results as compared to the benchmark model
where both ￿rms can set prices unrestrainedly. First, both ￿rms￿pro￿ts su⁄er most from the
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint when the size of the monopolistic segment is small. An
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment results in lower prices
to both ￿rms, whereas an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments shifts prices
upwards. These two forces a⁄ect the unrestrained ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts in the following way. When
the monopoly segment is large enough, the pro￿t-increasing e⁄ect of the asymmetric (third-
degree) no-discrimination constraint across segments outweighs the pro￿t-decreasing e⁄ect of
the asymmetric (behaviour-based) no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment.
The pro￿ts of the dominant ￿rm, however, augment when the e⁄ect of the asymmetric no-
discrimination constraint in the competitive segment (i.e. the behaviour-based constraint) is less
pronounced. Second, from a welfare perspective we ￿nd that the asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint increases total welfare and consumer welfare whenever the monopolistic segment is
not too large and entry is pro￿table.
The literature on oligopolistic price discrimination mainly addresses the welfare implications
when all ￿rms either engage in price discrimination or have symmetric pricing constraints; see
e.g. Chen (1997, 2009), Taylor (2003), Villas-Boas (1999), and Armstrong (2006, 2008) and
Stole (2007) for reviews. Yet, only few papers study the implications of asymmetric restrictions
on price discrimination.
An important paper which does study an asymmetric price discrimination constraint is Arm-
strong and Vickers (1993). They consider the competitive and welfare e⁄ects of a ban for the
dominant ￿rm on third-degree price discrimination. In their one-period model, the dominant
￿rm serves a monopolistic segment and competes in prices with a price-taking entrant on the re-
maining competitive segment. They ￿nd that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across
4segments decreases the price in the monopolistic segment while, given entry, the price rises in
the competitive segment. With this asymmetric no-discrimination constraint, the incumbent
monopolist protects its monopolistic segment and, consequently, responds less aggressively to
entry. The results of our dynamic two-period model lead to conclusions that may contradict
those from a static, one-period model. Our two-period analysis shows that when the monopoly
segment is not too large, competition intensi￿es when the dominant ￿rm faces an asymmet-
ric no-discrimination constraint, so that both ￿rms obtain less pro￿t. In other words, when
the monopoly segment is not too large, the pro￿t-increasing e⁄ect of the no-discrimination
constraint across segments is dominated by the pro￿t-decreasing e⁄ect within the competitive
segment. Consumer welfare then increases with the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
not only because more consumers pay lower prices, but also because more consumers are served
by their nearby provider. However, when the size of the monopoly segment increases, our results
become more in line with the static framework. That is, average prices increase with the size
of the monopolistic segment, and eventually result in higher average prices in the competitive
segment when its size becomes su¢ ciently large.
Another paper which is closely related to our contribution is Chen (2009), who uses three
variants of a dynamic model to study behaviour-based price discrimination between competing
￿rms. In his model, an incumbent has a monopoly position in the monopolistic segment and
competes in prices for consumers with a more e¢ cient ￿rm in the competitive segment. Firms
can engage in behaviour-based price discrimination by observing consumers￿purchase history.
Chen￿ s model shows that uniform pricing weakens competition while it is su¢ cient for price
discrimination to enhance long-run consumer welfare when the more e¢ cient ￿rm in the com-
petitive segment does not exit as a result of the incumbent￿ s pricing strategy. Our analysis and
￿ndings di⁄er in two respects. First, our model studies the e⁄ects on competition when there is
an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint, while the other ￿rm is left unconstrained. In Chen￿ s
model, a ban restricts both ￿rms￿pricing strategies. In contrast, our modeling allows to study
the asymmetric treatment of a dominant ￿rm by a regulatory body or competition authority.
Second, we show that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint may intensify competition
when the size of the monopolistic segment is not too large, and consequently, may enhance
consumer welfare only when the rival ￿rm remains in the market.
Gehrig et al. (2010) consider that the entrant has no customer information and therefore,
cannot discriminate between customers. The incumbent, in contrast, has consumer information
and can discriminate between loyal and other customers. They ￿nd that the entry possibilities
5do not hinge on the incumbent￿ s possibility to price discriminate on the basis of history-based
pricing. However, the price level is higher when the incumbent makes use of price discrimina-
tion as opposed to uniform pricing. Our set-up, however, di⁄ers since our approach endogenizes
￿rst-period competition, and therefore, takes into account intertemporal price competition. Fur-
thermore, we also consider a (third-degree) no-discrimination constraint across segments, linking
the competitive and monopolistic segments served by the incumbent.
Valletti et al. (2002) study the relationship between entry and a universal service obligation
that takes the form of a uniform pricing constraint. In their static model, they look at the
strategic e⁄ects of a uniform pricing and coverage constraint on hitherto unrelated markets.
The uniform pricing constraint in their model is only binding for the incumbent who serves
markets with di⁄erent characteristics whereas the entrants are only active in markets with
identical customers. In our model, a pricing constraint on all ￿rms would result in uniform
pricing in both periods.
Finally, our model has similarities with Pazgal and Soberman (2008). They consider whether
￿rms want to adopt behaviour-based discrimination in an environment where ￿rms can (i) com-
mit whether or not to price discriminate and (ii) o⁄er additional bene￿ts to their past consumers
in the second period. They ￿nd that when the bene￿ts that ￿rms can give to customers are iden-
tical, behaviour-based discrimination generally leads to lower pro￿ts for both ￿rms. When ￿rms
di⁄er substantially in providing second-period bene￿ts, the best response of the ￿rm providing
the lowest second-period bene￿ts sometimes is to set a uniform price and avoid behaviour-based
pricing. Our analysis di⁄ers in three important aspects. First, we assume that a ￿rm only can
commit not to practice price discrimination when it faces regulatory restrictions. These restric-
tions are asymmetric as they restrict the best response of one ￿rm only. When unrestricted,
￿rms cannot commit to forego price discrimination. We believe that lack of commitment is
often more realistic; in particular, when consumers know they are easily recognized by ￿rms, it
remains di¢ cult for sellers to commit not to use their customer information for price setting pur-
poses. Second, in our setting, the impact of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within
the competitive segment hinges on whether price discrimination across segments is allowed or
not. When not allowed, customers of the restrained ￿rm anticipate additional ￿harm￿ when
they buy from that ￿rm in the second period: they anticipate higher prices as a result of the
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. In other words, the asymmetric payo⁄s assumed in
Pazgal and Soberman (2008) result in our case from an asymmetric restriction across segments.
The size of the monopolistic segment determines the impact of this asymmetry. Third, in our
6setting, we have the interesting feature that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across
segments links unrelated segments and creates an asymmetry in payo⁄s. The total impact of
this restriction is driven by pro￿t both on the competitive and monopolistic segment.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model
where ￿rms can price freely. In Section 3 we analyze competitive behaviour with an asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint. This allows us to study regulatory and competition policy issues.
Section 4 o⁄ers a welfare comparison while Section 5 concludes.
2 The benchmark model
Two pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms, A and B, compete in prices on a Hotelling unit interval, with
A located at 0 and B at 1. They compete during two periods and set prices in each period.
Their marginal production costs are constant and normalized to zero. Consumers are distributed
uniformly on this competitive segment, have inelastic and unit demand in each period, and incur
transportation costs t per unit of distance. Their willingness to pay is su¢ ciently high to cover
the market and they have ￿xed preferences over time. Firms and consumers discount the future
at a common rate 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Both ￿rms charge a uniform price pi
1 in the ￿rst period, where
i = A;B. Our benchmark model closely follows Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) where ￿rms can
distinguish in period two their ￿rst-period customers from their rival￿ s. Customer recognition at
the ￿rm level across the two periods, therefore, o⁄ers both ￿rms the possibility in period two to
engage in behaviour-based price discrimination. In addition to their model, ￿rm A also enjoys a
monopolistic segment where consumers have a willingess to pay w. The mass of the competitive
segment is normalized to 1 while the mass of the monopolistic segment equals a.
Firm A serves its entire monopolistic segment and charges a price w in both periods. Ac-
cordingly, its total discounted pro￿ts in the monopolistic segment (denoted by subscript m)
equal
￿A￿
m = a(1 + ￿)w:
Consider the competitive segment. Starting the analysis with second-period competition,
assume that, without of loss of generality, ￿rst-period competition results in ￿rm A serving
customers who are located ￿to the left of x￿and ￿rm B serving customers ￿to the right of x￿ ,
with 0 ￿ x ￿ 1. There are two indi⁄erent consumers in the second period. The ￿rst indi⁄erent
consumer is at 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ x and satis￿es
pAA
2 + t￿ = pAB
2 + t(1 ￿ ￿)
7where p
ij
2 refers to a price charged in the second period to a consumer who purchased from ￿rm
i in period 1 and from ￿rm j in period 2, with i = A;B and j = A;B. The second indi⁄erent
consumer is at x ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and satis￿es
pBA
2 + t￿ = pBB
2 + t(1 ￿ ￿):
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Both ￿rms now have two best-responses; one for each part of the competitive segment they







by the trade-o⁄ of losing marginal customers and extracting rents on inframarginal customers







and depends on x. A larger x makes A more price-aggressive as the
decrease in rents on inframarginal customers is lower in x. Furthermore, pBA
2 is lower than pAA
2
as ￿rst-period customers already have revealed that they have a lower preference for A.4
Turning to ￿rst-period competition, the forward-looking ￿rst-period indi⁄erent consumer in
the competitive segment is located at x such that
pA
1 + tx + ￿[pAB
2 + t(1 ￿ x)] = pB
1 + t(1 ￿ x) + ￿[pBA
2 + tx];
where pi
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2 ￿ 2t(1 ￿ x)
￿
.
8As Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) have shown, consumers rationally anticipate that a price de-
crease today will result in a higher price tomorrow. As a result, ￿rst-period prices are higher
than in a static model because consumers￿demand is less price elastic. In equilibrium, both
￿rms equally share the competitive segment and enjoy identical pro￿ts in that segment. In
the second period, one third of the consumers in the competitive segment switch supplier since
￿ = 1=3 and ￿ = 2=3. From a total welfare perspective, consumers ine¢ ciently switch provider.
Since ￿rms poach each other￿ s ￿rst-period customers, second-period prices are so much lower so







The ￿rms￿ total discounted pro￿ts on the entire market are the combined results from the





c : It is clear that
A generates greater pro￿ts than does B as it enjoys a monopoly position in its monopolistic
segment.
Sections 3 and 4 o⁄er the competitive and welfare e⁄ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint imposed on one ￿rm only, i.e. ￿rm A. Since ￿rm A is active on a monopolistic and
competitive segment, general competition law or regulatory constraints may impose such a no-
discrimination constraint on ￿rm A. Firm B, in contrast, is free to charge its customers di⁄erent
prices at any moment. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint imposes on ￿rm A (i) to not
price discriminate within the competitive segment (between prior customers and customers from
the other ￿rm) and (ii) to not price discriminate across segments (the monopoly segment and
the competitive segment). When the size of the monopolistic segment is zero, the asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint coincides with no discrimination within the competitive segment
only. For larger sizes of the monopolistic segment, the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
also imposes no discrimination across segments.5 Competition law typically applies when a ￿rm
has signi￿cant market power which implies in our setup a su¢ ciently large monopolistic segment.
Regulatory constraints, in contrast, may apply for di⁄erent sizes of the monopolistic segment.
We assume throughout our analysis that the constrained ￿rm A ￿nds it always pro￿table to
5In Section 4, we brie￿ y turn to the welfare implications of a restriction that imposes a no-discrimination
constraint between segments but allows for price discrimination within the competitive segment. However, in case
of a universal service obligation, no-discrimination constraints are typically observed either within a competitive
segment or both within and across segments. Our welfare results will show that such a constraint would generally
lead to lower welfare. This may explain the observed practice of universal service obligations either within
competitive segments or within and across segments.
9serve its monopolistic segment, to remain active in the competitive segment, and poach some of
its rival￿ s customers in the second period.
3 Asymmetric no-discrimination constraint: competitive e⁄ects
An asymmetric no-discrimination constraint implies that ￿rm A can neither engage in behaviour-
based price discrimination within the competitive segment, nor third-degree price discriminate
across its monopolistic segment and the competitive segment. Although ￿rm A can charge
di⁄erent prices across both periods, it must charge a uniform price within each period. In other
words, ￿rm A has a no-discrimination constraint and must charge e pA￿
1 in period one and e pA￿
2 in
period two to all its customers, where ￿e ￿is used to denote the asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint. In contrast, ￿rm B practices behaviour-based discrimination. Clearly, such an
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint introduces a link between the monopolistic segment
and the competitive segment when the size of the monopolistic segment is strictly positive.









and is lower than the benchmark model since we assumed that A preferred to charge w to all
its customers in the benchmark model.
We now ￿rst provide our analysis in a general way, and discuss the two forces leading to
di⁄erential prices compared to the benchmark model. Afterwards we discuss how an asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment generates competitive e⁄ects and
how adding an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across the competitive and monopolistic
segment impacts competition. We further link our ￿ndings with competition law and regulatory
issues.
Starting from period two, suppose ￿rst-period competition has led ￿rm A to serve all con-
sumers to the left of e x in the competitive segment, and ￿rm B to serve all consumers to the
right of e x. In the second period, there are two indi⁄erent consumers. The ￿rst is located at
0 ￿ e ￿ ￿ e x and is characterized by
e pA
2 + te ￿ = e pAB
2 + t(1 ￿ e ￿)
while the second indi⁄erent consumer located at e x ￿ e ￿ ￿ 1 is characterized by
e pA
2 + te ￿ = e pBB
2 + t(1 ￿ e ￿):
10Figure 1: Second-period best-reply curves for a = 0.
Hence, ￿rm A determines the price e pA
2 that maximizes its second-period pro￿ts in both the
monopolistic and competitive segments
e ￿A
2 (e pA





e ￿ + e ￿ ￿ e x
￿i
while ￿rm B maximizes
e ￿B
2 (e pAB
2 ; e pBB
2 ) ￿ e pAB
2 [e x ￿ e ￿] + e pBB
2 [1 ￿ e ￿]:
The best-responses look like
~ pA
2 = 0:5[t(1 + a ￿ ~ x) + 0:5(~ pAB
2 + ~ pBB
2 )]
~ pAB
2 = 0:5(~ pA
2 + t(2~ x ￿ 1)) and ~ pBB
2 = 0:5(~ pA
2 + t)
for ￿rm A and B, respectively.
11By making use of the best-reply curves of Figure 1, we illustrate the forces that explain the
di⁄erences with our benchmark model. (Figure 1 illustrates a situation for a equal to zero.)
Second-period pro￿t maximization leads to best-reply curves which now depend on a and ~ x.
Firm A￿ s best-response contains two parts. The ￿rst part, t(1 + a ￿ ~ x), tells us that A￿ s price
increases with the size a of the monopolistic segment and decreases with the ￿rst-period market
share on the competitive segment. The second part reveals that ￿rm A now optimally reacts
on B￿ s averaged best-response price 0:5(~ pAB
2 + ~ pBB
2 ). This averaged best-response is depicted
as the dotted line. The solid line ~ pA
2 (~ pAB
2 ; ~ pBB
2 ) in Figure 1 represents ￿rm A￿ s best response
when the no-discrimination constraint applies. The dashed lines pAA
2 (pAB
2 ) and pBA
2 (pBB
2 ) o⁄er
a comparison with ￿rm A￿ s best-responses from the benchmark model. Firm B￿ s best-responses
~ pAB
2 ( ~ pA) and ~ pBB
2 ( ~ pA) also increase with the size of ￿rm A￿ s monopolistic segment a since ~ pA
2
depends positively on a. Solving the best responses results in
e pA
2 =








t(5 ￿ e x + 2a)
6
:
We now turn to ￿rst-period competition. The forward-looking ￿rst-period indi⁄erent consumer
in the competitive segment is located at e x such that
e pA
1 + te x + ￿[e pAB
2 + t(1 ￿ e x)] = e pB
1 + t(1 ￿ e x) + ￿[e pA
2 + te x]:
After substitution of both ￿rms￿second-period prices, one obtains ￿rm A￿ s ￿rst-period market
share on the competitive segment:
e x =
6(e pB
1 ￿ e pA
1 ) + t(6 ￿ ￿) + 2at￿
t(12 ￿ 5￿)
:
Firm A maximizes the following total discounted pro￿t in both segments
e ￿A(e pA
1 ; e pB
1 ) ￿ e pA





e ￿ + e ￿ ￿ e x
￿i
whereas ￿rm B maximizes
e ￿B(e pB
1 ; e pA
1 ) ￿ e pB
1 (1 ￿ e x) + ￿
h
e pBB
2 (1 ￿ e ￿) + e pAB
2 (e x ￿ e ￿)
i
:





































We explain the intuition behind these equilibrium prices by distinguishing two e⁄ects ￿a
commitment e⁄ect and price sensitivity e⁄ect. First consider the commitment e⁄ect. Observe
that e pA￿
1 > e pB￿
1 . If the indi⁄erent consumer e x opts for ￿rm B in period 1, she expects to be
poached in the next period by ￿rm A at a price e pA
2 . Firm A￿ s poaching price is rather high
as A must charge an identical price to its ￿rst-period customers in the competitive and the
monopolistic segment. If, however, the indi⁄erent consumer visits ￿rm A in the ￿rst-period, she
anticipates a more attractive second-period poaching price by ￿rm B since e pAB￿
2 < e pA
2 . Firm
A is therefore regarded as an unattractive poacher because it is committed to charge a high
poaching price. This forces ￿rm B to charge a lower price than A in period 1 and allows ￿rm
A to extract more surplus from its ￿rst-period customers. This commitment e⁄ect explains
the di⁄erences between the prices charged. We also observe that both prices e pA￿
1 and e pB￿
1 are
increasing in a, although e pA￿
1 depends much stronger on the size of the monopolistic segment.
An asymmetric no-discrimination constraint implies that all prices in the competitive segment
increase in a, indicating that the degree of competition depends on the size of the monopolistic
segment.
Second, there is also a price sensitivity e⁄ect. The price levels with the asymmetric no-
discrimination constraint di⁄er from the benchmark model. A price sensitivity comparison
of the marginal consumer between the benchmark model and asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint is useful to explain the di⁄erent price levels. We start with our benchmark model
for the competitive segment. As in Fudenberg and Tirole￿ s (2000) set-up, ￿rst-period demand
increases with ￿ when ￿rm A decreases its ￿rst-period price by a small amount ". The marginal
consumer is now located at x = 0:5 + ￿, where ￿ measures the marginal consumer￿ s sensitivity
to this price change. Accordingly, substitution of the second-period prices, and simplifying6,
results in
6Following Armstrong (2006), we solve
p
A
1 ￿ " + t(0:5 + ￿) + ￿[
t
3
(1 + 4￿) + t(0:5 ￿ ￿)] = p
B
1 + (0:5 ￿ ￿)t + ￿[
t
3






Clearly, the marginal consumer is less sensitive to a ￿rst-period price change than in the static
Hotelling model (see Armstrong, 2006a) ￿indeed, in a static model, where ￿ = 0; we ￿nd that
￿ = "=2t. The reasoning is that she now weighs o⁄ two alternatives. On the one hand, if the
marginal consumer decides to buy from ￿rm A, he enjoys a ￿rst-period price cut of one unit
by ￿rm A but su⁄ers in the next period since ￿rm B￿ s second-period poaching price increases
in ￿ at rate 4t=3. On the other hand, when he decides to buy from ￿rm B, he does not enjoy
the price cut today but will enjoy a lower price in the next period as ￿rm A￿ s second-period
poaching price decreases in ￿ at rate 4t=3. The total e⁄ect as re￿ ected by the value of ￿ results
in a lower price sensitivity of demand compared to the static Hotelling model, and coincides
with a model in which neither ￿rm practices behaviour-based discrimination. We now turn to
the case with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint where we can compute ~ ￿ as follows.
When ￿rm A changes its ￿rst-period price slightly to ~ pA






While the marginal consumer again weighs o⁄ two similar alternatives as before, we ￿nd that
an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint results in more price-sensitive consumer behavior
than the static or unconstrained benchmark model. This stems from the following forces. If
the marginal consumer decides to buy from ￿rm A, he enjoys a ￿rst-period price cut of one
unit by ￿rm A. In the next period, he now only incurs a small increase in price as ￿rm B￿ s
second-period poaching price increases by 5t=6 in ￿ only. However, when he decides to buy from
￿rm B, he does not enjoy the price cut today but will enjoy a lower price in the next period as
￿rm A￿ s second-period poaching price which decreases in ￿ at rate t=3. Thus the indirect e⁄ects
on the poaching prices make the demand more elastic, re￿ ected in the value of ￿, as compared to
the static Hotelling model or the unconstrained benchmark model. This price sensitivity e⁄ect
explains the di⁄erence of the price level between the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
and the benchmark model.
7The indi⁄erent consumer is characterized by ~ p
A
1 ￿ " + t(e x + ￿) + ￿(
t
6(5(e x + ￿) + 2a ￿ 1) + t(e x ￿ ￿)) =
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respectively. Both are not larger than 0.5 but ￿rm A￿ s total market share in both segments
increases from period one to period two. This leads to discounted pro￿ts in the competitive













t(a2(983￿3 + 6624￿2 ￿ 32400￿ + 31104) ￿ 6a(54 ￿ 31￿)(29￿2 + 116￿ ￿ 288))
48(54 ￿ 31￿)2 :
The ￿rst part of both expressions captures ￿rms￿pro￿ts if there would be no monopolistic
segment. It indicates that both ￿rms￿pro￿ts decrease when ￿rm A faces a no-discrimination
constraint. Firm B su⁄ers more than ￿rm A.8 The second part re￿ ects the positive e⁄ect
on both ￿rms￿pro￿ts in the competitive segment when the size of the monopolistic segment
augments. Firm A￿ s pricing behavior is less aggressive with the size of the monopolistic segment
since the incentives to protect its monopoly rents increase.
Finally, ￿rms￿total discounted pro￿ts on the entire market are obtained by adding up the
results in the competitive and monopolistic segments, resulting in
e ￿A￿
￿ e ￿A￿
m + e ￿A￿
c and e ￿B￿
￿ e ￿B￿
c :
We now interpret the e⁄ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination contraints on competition.
Consider ￿rst a situation where the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only applies within
the competitive segment (i.e. the size of the monopolistic segment is zero). Overall competition
for both ￿rms is now keener than in the benchmark case: the commitment e⁄ect induces ￿rm B
to price more aggressively in the ￿rst period and the price sensitivity e⁄ect makes ￿rst period
8This result should not be seen as contradicting Thisse and Vives (1988). They show that a ￿rm has a pro￿t
incentive to engage in price discrimination whenever its rival makes use of a uniform pricing strategy. From this
reasoning, ￿rm B should perform better than ￿rm A. The following two elements explain however why ￿rm B
performs worse. First, the no-discrimination constraint imposed on ￿rm A makes it an unattractive poacher in
period 2. This commitment e⁄ect forces ￿rm B to charge a lower price than A in the ￿rst period. Since both
￿rms serve half of the market, ￿rm B performs worse in period 1. Second, ￿rm B cannot commit not to price
discriminate in the second period. In line with Thisse and Vives (1988), ￿rm B ￿nds it optimal to charge two
prices e p
AB￿
2 < e p
A
2 < e p
BB￿
2 since ￿rm B￿ s pro￿ts are lower.when charging only one price in period 2. Firm B￿ s
pro￿ts, however, su⁄er more from the commitment e⁄ect and explain its worse performance.
15demand more elastic. Next, we add an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments
by considering a positive size for the monopolistic segment, and evaluate it for varying size of a.
For low enough a, overall competition for both ￿rms is still keener than in the benchmark case.
However, for a high enough a, competition on the competitive segment becomes less severe
so that B￿ s pro￿ts are higher than in the benchmark model. That is, ￿rm B enjoys higher
overall pro￿ts with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint since ￿rm A now su¢ ciently
weakens its competitive response. Firm A￿ s pro￿ts su⁄er from the asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint when ￿ is not too small. Intuitively, when ￿ is small (i.e. close to zero), our setup
approaches a static analysis: ￿rm A then may increase its pro￿ts from being able to commit to
non-discrimination for at least some range of a (as in Armstrong and Vickers (1993)).
Our discussion above is summarized in Result 1.
Result 1. Compared to the benchmark model, an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
leads to (i) ￿rms￿joint pro￿ts to increase if and only if the monopolistic segment is su¢ ciently
large; (ii) ￿rm A￿ s pro￿ts to decrease for ￿ not too small; and (iii) ￿rm B￿ s pro￿ts to increase
if and only if the monopolistic segment is large enough.
Proof: See Appendix.
4 Asymmetric no-discrimination constraint: welfare analysis
We now study how an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint impacts welfare on the com-
petitive segment. We make a distinction between total welfare and consumer welfare. Total
welfare in our setting is determined by frictions, i.e. transportation costs. Consumer welfare,
however, also takes into account prices incurred by consumers. Results for both total welfare
and consumer welfare hinge on the size of the monopolistic segment. We therefore start our
discussion by considering a small monopolistic segment a. To identify forces, take a to be zero.
This implies that the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is only a prohibition to not price
discriminate by ￿rm A within the competitive segment. With a equal to zero, the asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint provides greater total welfare and consumer welfare compared to
the benchmark model. These results stems from two complementary forces. First, the restriction
improves the second-period allocation of consumers as fewer consumers visit their non-nearby
provider, whereas the ￿rst-period allocation is identical to our benchmark model. The asym-
metric no-discrimination constraint, therefore, results in a higher total welfare. Second, overall
competition with the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is greater than when ￿rms can set
16prices unrestrainedly. Consumer welfare is therefore higher with the no-discrimination constraint
as both prices and frictions incurred by consumers are lower.
Consider now the forces when the size of the monopolistic segment becomes positive and
increases further. That is consider the situation where one adds a no-discrimination constraint
across segments ￿monopolistic and competitive segments to the no-discrimination constraint
within the competitive segment. As long as a is small, total welfare and consumer welfare
are higher with the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint: the negative welfare impacts of
the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments does not dominate the positive
welfare e⁄ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment.
However, a large monopolistic segment increases prices and stimulates ine¢ cient travelling in
the competitive segment. This leads to lower consumer welfare and total welfare. Consumer
welfare and total welfare become lower than in the benchmark model when a becomes large. The
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint then is mainly driven by its across market segments
impact, and therefore dampens competition in the competitive segment and induces ￿rm B to
enjoy larger pro￿ts than in the benchmark model. Therefore the asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint generates redistributive e⁄ects: it favours consumers in the monopolistic segment by
introducing competition at the expense of consumers in the competitive segment where compe-
tition decreases. Furthermore, it stimulates the impact of frictions as more consumers visit their
non-nearby supplier, leading to lower total welfare. Finally, an asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint unambiguously increases consumer surplus in the monopolistic segment.
The above discussion on consumer and total welfare is summarized in result 2.
Result 2. Compare the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint to the benchmark model
with unrestricted pricing and consider the competitive segment. We ￿nd that (i) the asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint strictly increases total welfare as long as the size of the monopolistic
segment is not too large; otherwise total welfare is higher in the benchmark model, and (ii) the
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint strictly increases consumer welfare as long as the size of
the monopolistic segment is not too large; otherwise the benchmark model yields higher consumer
welfare.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
We now compare this result to Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and further discuss what would
happen if entry were modelled. Armstrong and Vickers (1993) have shown that in a static model,
an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint weakens competition and reduces welfare on the
competitive segment if the entrant is already in the market. In our model, we have shown the
17opposite when the monopoly segment is small enough: (i) the asymmetric no-discrimination con-
straint reduces all ￿rms￿pro￿ts (Result 1), and (ii) the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
leads to greater social welfare (Result 2). This stands in strong contrast with the Armstrong
and Vickers result. However, when the monopoly segment is more important to ￿rm A, all
￿rms￿pro￿ts increase from an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint and the Armstrong and
Vickers results reappear in our setting. In other words, when the monopoly segment is small
enough, the e⁄ect of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment
(i.e., a dynamic behaviour-based price discrimination constraint) outweighs the e⁄ects from an
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments (i.e., a static third-degree price dis-
crimination constraint). The opposite results holds when the monopoly segment is su¢ ciently
important.
Armstrong and Vickers (1993) also notice that when the entrant must still decide to enter, an
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint may be pro-competitive when absent such a constraint,
keener competition results in preventing pro￿table entry. A no-discrimination constraint may
then serve as an entry-enhancing and pro-competitive policy measure. Our analysis has shown
that this entry-enhancing feature of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only carries over
to our setting when the size of the monopolistic segment is su¢ ciently large as then the entrant￿ s
pro￿ts increase. However, when the size of the monopolistic segment is small and the entrant￿ s
pro￿ts decrease, an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint may result in ￿rm B not entering
the market, leaving ￿rm A with a monopoly. Summing up, if entry were costly, the probability
of entry might be lower in the presence of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint as ￿rm B
might not be able to recover the ￿xed cost of entry. Whether ex ante welfare would be greater
with or without such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint depends therefore on the size
of the monopoly segment.
We conclude the welfare section by discussing the welfare implications of an asymmetric
no-discrimination constraint which would apply only across market segments but not within
the competitive segment. In other words, poaching within the competitive segment would be
allowed but ￿rm A would need to charge the same price to its loyal customers on the competitive
segment and its customers on the monopolistic segment. From a welfare perspective, such a no-
discrimination constraint is dominated by an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the
competitive segment and across segments. Total welfare and consumer welfare are lower when
the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only applies across market segments compared to
when it also applies within the competitive segment. This may explain why an asymmetric
18no-discrimination constraint across market segments but not within the competitive segment is
not observed. This is in line with the actual practice of universal service obligation restrictions
where a no-discrimination constraint applies ￿rst within market segments, or applies both within
and across market segments.
5 Conclusion and policy implications
This paper has analysed the competitive and welfare e⁄ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination
constraint. A regulator or competition authority typically imposes such a constraint in an
oligopoly only on the one ￿rm with signi￿cant market power. In our model the ￿rm with
signi￿cant market power is the only ￿rm serving a certain part of the market (the monopolistic
segment), whilst facing competition on another part (the competitive segment). In a regulatory
context this ￿rm can be the former state monopolist after the market has been liberalised and
competition has been introduced in part of the market. In a competition policy context this
￿rm can be a dominant ￿rm that may abuse its position by applying price discrimination.
The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint that we have studied prohibits both behaviour-
based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination
across the monopolistic and competitive segments. These forms of price discrimination are
often observed in a regulatory and competition policy context, judging by actual regulatory
measures and by case law. The policy justi￿cations for the constraint include the prevention
of competition-reducing exclusionary strategies by dominant ￿rms, the protection of certain
customer groups that face no choice of supplier and that risk paying excessively high prices, and
the encouragement of entry by weakening the price responses to entrants by the incumbent.
Our main ￿ndings and their policy implications are as follows. First, an asymmetric no-
discrimination constraint is only welfare-enhancing if the monopolistic segment is not too large.
For a competition authority with the objective to optimize total or consumer welfare this implies
the following. In the case of ￿super-dominance￿ , where the monopolistic segment is very large
relative to the competitive segment, imposing an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint on
the dominant ￿rm does not improve welfare. Only in circumstances of weak dominance does
the constraint enhance welfare.
Whilst most competition authorities are interested mainly in optimising total and consumer
welfare, regulators often pro-actively encourage entry to create more competition. We ￿nd that
an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only leads to higher pro￿ts for the entrant if the
19monopolistic segment is large enough. Practically this implies that the policy objective of en-
couraging entry is not served by the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint if the monopolistic
segment is small relative to the competitive segment. In recently liberalised sectors the incum-
bent typically has a relatively large monopolistic segment; in these circumstances the constraint
imposed by the regulator does encourage entry. In later stages after liberalisation, however, once
the competitive segment has become large relative to the monopolistic segment, the asymmetric
constraint e⁄ectively reduces the further growth of entrants.
6 Appendix
In order to have an internal solution where ￿rm A is active both on its own ￿rst-period turf
and on ￿rm B￿ s ￿rst-period turf, we need to have that 0 < e ￿ < e x < e ￿ < 1. The most stringent
condition is that e ￿ > 0 which is satis￿ed whenever a < 54￿31￿
52￿27￿ ￿ amax. So we will assume that
the monopolistic segment is always su¢ ciently small, i.e. smaller than amax such that ￿rm A is
active also on its ￿rst-period turf of the competitive segment.
Proof of Result 1:
(i) De￿ne the di⁄erence in ￿rms￿joint pro￿ts on the competitive segment between the asym-
metric no-discrimination constraint and the benchmark model as ￿￿A+B ￿ e ￿A￿
c + e ￿B￿
c ￿2￿i￿
c .
The function ￿￿A+B is quadratic in a, and ￿￿A+B = 0 whenever a = fa1;a2g with 0 < a1 <
amax < a2. Moreover since ￿￿A+B ja=0= ￿77￿t=144 < 0 and @2￿￿A+B=@a2 < 0, ￿rms￿joint
pro￿ts on the competitive segment increase whenever a1 < a < amax.
(ii) De￿ne the di⁄erence in ￿rm A￿ s pro￿ts on the competitive segment between the asym-
metric no-discrimination constraint and the benchmark model as ￿￿A ￿ e ￿A￿
c ￿￿A￿
c : Note that
￿￿A ja=0= ￿17￿t=72 < 0: Further, ￿￿A is a quadratic expression in a and exhibits an inverse
U-shape. Simulations reveal that ￿￿A remains negative for all possible values of a as long as
￿ is larger than approximately 0:35. Put di⁄erently, as long as ￿ is larger than 0:35, ￿rm A￿ s
pro￿ts on the competitive segment are harmed by the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint.
For lower values of ￿, the impact of the asymmetric ban on ￿rm A￿ s pro￿ts hinges on the size of
a.
(iii) De￿ne the di⁄erence in ￿rm B￿ s pro￿ts on the competitive segment between the asym-
metric no-discrimination constraint and the benchmark model as ￿￿B ￿ e ￿B￿
c ￿ ￿B￿
c : The
function ￿￿B is quadratic in a, @2￿￿B=@a2 > 0, and ￿￿B = 0 whenever a = fa1B;a2Bg with
20a1B < 0 < a2B < amax. Since ￿￿B ja=0= ￿43￿t=144 < 0 and @￿￿B=@a j0￿a￿a2B￿ 0, we have
that ￿￿B > 0 for all a2B < a < amax.
Proof of Result 2
Consider ￿rst the result regarding total welfare which is part (i) of the result. We focus on
the non-￿nancial outlays, i.e. ine¢ ciencies stemming from transportation costs, to discuss total
welfare. The lower the non-￿nancial outlays, the higher total welfare. Non-￿nancial outlays in





















































a2(2073￿3 ￿ 4480￿2 ￿ 4464￿ + 10368) + 2a￿(17￿ ￿ 36)(31￿ ￿ 54) + (9￿ + 8)(31￿ ￿ 54)2￿
(31￿ ￿ 54)2 :
As we can see, the non-￿nancial outlays under uniform pricing obligation are quadratic in the
size of the monopolistic segment a. It is easy to show that for a = 0, the non-￿nancial outlays
in the benchmark model are higher than for the uniform pricing obligation. The two equations
above become identical to each other when a = a1;where a1 is the highest root which makes
these two equations identical. (The lowest root is negative and therefore not relevant.) Notice
that a1 is smaller than amax. In sum, we therefore have shown that for 0 ￿ a < a1 total welfare
is strictly higher under the uniform pricing obligation. For a1 ￿ a ￿ amax, total welfare is higher
under the benchmark model.
Consider now consumer surplus which is part (ii) of our Result. To address the issue of
consumer surplus, we compare total outlays on the competitive segment ￿￿nancial outlays and
non-￿nancial outlays. This boils down to the sum of the non-￿nancial outlays and the ￿rms
pro￿ts on the competitive segment.







Adding this to the non-￿nancial outlays of
21t(11￿ + 9)
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t(a2(983￿3 + 6624￿2 ￿ 32400￿ + 31104) ￿ 6a(54 ￿ 31￿)(29￿2 + 116￿ ￿ 288))
48(54 ￿ 31￿)2 :
Total outlays for the uniform pricing obligation are the sum of these ￿nancial outlays and the
previously mentioned non-￿nancial outlays.
Evaluated for a = 0, we ￿nd that the total outlays for the benchmark model are larger than




Furthermore, evaluated for a = 0 we ￿nd that total outlays increase in a for the model with
uniform pricing whereas they are constant for the benchmark model. More general (i.e. for all
admissible values of a < amax) we have that the total outlays for the two models are identical
when a = a2, with a2 < amax. Again the second root for which the total outlays are identical
lies outside the relevant range. We therefore have shown that for 0 ￿ a < a2 consumer welfare
is strictly higher under the uniform pricing obligation. For a2 ￿ a ￿ amax, consumer welfare
is higher under the benchmark model. Finally, we ￿nd that a1 ￿ a2 if ￿ is low whereas a2 ￿
a1 otherwise.
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